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CHOICES SHOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES: 
FAILURE TO VACCINATE, HARM TO OTHERS, 
AND CIVIL LIABILITY 
Douglas S. Diekema* † 
Introduction 
A parent’s decision not to vaccinate a child may place others at risk if 
the child becomes infected and exposes others to the disease. Should an 
individual harmed by an infection transmitted from a child whose parents 
chose to forgo vaccination have a negligence claim against those parents? 
While I do not hold a legal degree and therefore cannot speak directly to 
issues of law, as a physician and ethicist it seems to me that the basic 
elements that comprise negligence claims—harm, duty, breach of duty, and 
causation—are met in some cases where parents forgo vaccination. 
I. The Practice of Childhood Vaccination 
The vaccination of children has proved to be one of the most effective 
and important health interventions of the twentieth century. With the 
possible exception of improved sanitation and clean water, no other 
intervention in modern history has impacted children’s health as 
significantly. Yet despite the phenomenal success of childhood vaccination, 
thousands of parents in the United States choose not to vaccinate their 
children each year. In many cases, these children can still attend public 
schools by taking advantage of personal belief exemptions available in many 
states. These parents do not represent a homogenous group: some parents 
may object to immunization on religious or philosophical grounds, some 
may object to what appears to be a painful assault on their child, and others 
may believe that the benefits of immunization do not justify the risks to their 
child. The number of parents choosing to forgo vaccination for their 
children appears to be increasing, in part because of the success of 
vaccination programs. Parents today have little or no experience with 
vaccine-preventable diseases like polio, haemophilus influenzae type B, or 
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measles. This fading social memory makes the benefits of vaccination more 
difficult to appreciate. 
Currently, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that children under 
the age of six receive vaccination against fourteen infectious diseases: 
hepatitis B, hepatitis A, rotavirus, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, haemophilus 
influenzae type B, pneumococcus, poliovirus, measles, mumps, rubella, 
varicella (chicken pox), and influenza. Vaccination against two additional 
infectious diseases, meningococcus and human papillomavirus, is 
recommended between the ages of eleven and twelve.  
With the exception of tetanus, these diseases spread only from person to 
person. In other words, to get a disease like measles, mumps, or influenza, 
you must be exposed in some way to an individual who is already infected 
with the disease agent. Vaccination not only provides direct protection to the 
individual who gets vaccinated, but also eliminates that individual as a 
source of infectious transmission. The latter effect is important because it 
provides indirect protection to unvaccinated individuals by surrounding 
them with vaccinated individuals—a phenomenon known as herd immunity.  
Herd immunity is necessary to protect those individuals who are not yet 
vaccinated, those who must remain unvaccinated, and those few who remain 
or become susceptible to disease despite vaccination. Most vaccines cannot 
be given until a child is two to twelve months of age. Prior to that time, 
these young children remain susceptible to vaccine-preventable diseases. 
This age group is absolutely dependent on herd immunity to protect them 
from infection. Additionally, some children cannot be vaccinated against 
one or more diseases because of medical contraindications, past allergic 
reaction to a vaccine, or underlying medical conditions. Further, a small 
percentage of vaccinated individuals will either remain or become 
susceptible to disease despite vaccination. These children remain at risk 
despite every effort by their parents to protect them from disease acquisition 
through vaccination, and they depend on herd immunity for protection.  
II. Vaccine-Preventable Diseases Have the 
Potential To Cause Harm  
All of the vaccine-preventable infectious diseases have the potential to 
cause death or significant disability. Some of these diseases, like measles, 
chicken pox, and influenza, are commonly perceived as minor illnesses that 
result in no more harm than several days of discomfort followed by a full 
recovery. This may lead some parents to question the need for vaccination 
against such diseases. 
While severe complications are rare for most of these diseases, they can 
be devastating in those few who experience them. Measles, for example, 
causes pneumonia in 1 out of every 17 cases, encephalitis in 1 out of every 
2000 cases, and death in 3 out of every 1000 cases. Otherwise healthy 
infants die of pertussis every year in the United States; chicken pox has been 
associated with devastating cases of necrotizing faciitis, or “flesh-eating 
bacteria”; mumps can cause infertility in males; hepatitis can cause severe 
liver damage; a pregnant woman who contracts rubella is at significant risk 
of delivering a baby with devastating birth defects; and influenza still causes 
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thousands of deaths each year. Every one of the vaccine-preventable 
diseases has the potential to cause significant harm to those who get 
infected. 
III. Parents Have a Duty to Avoid Causing Harm to Others 
Do parents have a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent their children 
from spreading infectious diseases that have the potential to harm others? In 
On Liberty, John Stuart Mill seemed to recognize a duty not to cause harm 
to others. He argued that coercive state action could be justified where an 
individual’s decision or action places others at risk of harm: “The only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” 
Mill’s justification for interfering with the freedom of an individual has 
become know as the “harm principle.” Vaccination laws rely on the harm 
principle for their justification. State immunization programs and school 
mandates exist not simply because they provide a direct health benefit to the 
vaccinated individual, but because they protect other individuals in the 
community—those who must remain unimmunized for medical reasons and 
those who remain nonimmune despite vaccination. The existence of these 
“school mandate laws” would suggest that there is, in fact, a civic duty to 
vaccinate one’s children in the interest of protecting those in the population 
who remain susceptible.  
Courts have repeatedly upheld compulsory vaccination laws in the 
United States as a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power—even in 
the absence of a disease outbreak. Such laws survive constitutional 
challenge even in cases where they conflict with the religious beliefs of 
individuals. In the first such case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court held that: 
the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person 
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to 
be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There 
are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the 
common good. 
While both the harm principle and Jacobson are primarily concerned 
with justifying coercive state action, one could argue that laws requiring 
vaccination of citizens exist to enforce a duty that each citizen has to every 
other member of the community. These laws suggest that a duty exists, even 
though most states provide the opportunity to opt out of vaccination on the 
basis of personal beliefs. The existence of the duty to avoid harming others 
does not cease to exist simply because one objects to the mechanism (in this 
case vaccination) by which states ensure that protection. 
In fact, parents who choose not to vaccinate their children illustrate the 
“free-rider” problem—they take advantage of the benefit created by the 
participation of others in the vaccination program while refusing to 
participate and share equitably in the risks and obligations of the program. 
These individuals act unfairly to others in the community by pursuing self-
interest ahead of civic responsibility. Even if the community refuses to 
DIEKEMA FI FTP2 M.DOC 1/16/2009 4:43 PM 
2009] Failure to Vaccinate 93 
 
coerce or punish these free riders, they remain morally culpable in an 
important way.  
Finally, the expectation that parents vaccinate their children to prevent 
harm to others is a reasonable one for several reasons. First, vaccination 
offers direct, demonstrated benefit to the child. Second, the safety of 
childhood vaccines is well established and the risk of serious side effects or 
complications is exceedingly rare. Finally, existing data clearly support the 
conclusion that the risks to a child of remaining unvaccinated, even in the 
United States, exceed any risks that might be attributable to vaccines 
themselves. Given this, placing a duty on parents to vaccinate their children 
is reasonable and represents prudent public policy. 
IV. Failure to Vaccinate One’s Children 
Constitutes a Breach of Duty  
If parents have a duty to vaccinate their children, then it would follow 
that most situations in which a parent fails to do so would constitute a 
breach of that duty. There may be at least three notable exceptions to this 
rule. First, a parent’s duty to vaccinate a child requires vaccination of the 
child at the recommended time, and not before then. Second, the duty to 
vaccinate does not exist for those children who have specific and recognized 
contraindications or those who have previously experienced side effects that 
medical professionals agree preclude further vaccination against that agent. 
Finally, the duty to protect others by taking reasonable steps to keep one’s 
child from spreading disease is discharged when a parent has made a good 
faith effort to get their child vaccinated. In the event of vaccine failure—
where an individual child, despite vaccination, contracts and spreads disease 
to another—the parents can still be said to have fulfilled their duty. 
Likewise, inability to pay for vaccinations may also excuse a parent from 
this duty. Vaccination is a public good, but not all states assure that citizens 
can obtain vaccination at no cost. In those states, it may be unreasonable to 
expect parents to fulfill this duty without assistance. 
V. The Question of Causation 
The question of causation turns on whether a parent whose child has 
suffered serious harm from a vaccine-preventable disease can claim that the 
harm is the result of another parent’s decision to forgo vaccination of their 
own child. In considering that question, several factors are important. First, 
there is little question that the harm in this case results from transmission of 
an infectious agent from one person to another. While it may not always be 
possible, when the specific person who spread disease to a harmed person 
can be reliably identified, establishing causation is a fairly easy task.  
While the direct cause of the harm is the infectious agent, the vector—in 
this case, a child—is an essential link in the chain of causation between 
infectious agent and a serious consequence of infection. A reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of failure to vaccinate a child is the possibility that 
the child will contract the disease and spread it to others. In this situation, 
were it not for the failure to vaccinate that child, the spread of disease would 
almost certainly not have occurred. This case for causation may be 
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weakened if the person who has been harmed is also unvaccinated by 
choice. In that case, there is an intervening and more direct cause of the 
harm—the fact that the harmed person had forgone the opportunity to gain 
direct protection through vaccination. While this would not break the chain 
of causation, it might allow the defendant to claim contributory or 
comparative negligence, thus reducing or eliminating any damages. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that vaccine-preventable diseases can cause significant 
harm to infected individuals, that parents have a duty to take reasonable 
steps to avoid having their children spread infectious diseases to others, that 
failure to vaccinate an eligible child constitutes a breach of that duty, and 
that failure to vaccinate a child can be a proximate cause of harm to another. 
I recognize that negligence law may introduce important nuances into my 
analysis, but I would also argue that justice might demand that a tort remedy 
be available in this situation.  
If an ethical basis for tort liability exists, it resides in providing a 
mechanism by which someone who is made worse off by the careless or 
self-serving actions of another can claim recompense for that harm. 
Negligence law recognizes that persons should be accountable for their 
decisions and actions when those decisions and actions unreasonably place 
others in harm’s way. A parent whose child suffers brain damage, death, or 
disability as a result of contact with another child whose parents chose to 
forgo vaccination has been harmed unfairly. While the current system in the 
United States has a publicly funded mechanism for compensating those 
injured as a result of vaccine side effects, there is no corresponding public 
mechanism to guarantee that a child harmed by an unvaccinated child will 
receive the medical care, services, and support necessary. The best 
mechanism for justice in this situation may be the tort system. It would be 
unreasonable for those who have made good-faith efforts to participate in 
the vaccination program to suffer harm at the hands of those who have not, 
without some mechanism for recompense. 
